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Abstract
This paper studies the trade linkages between South Africa and the BRIC
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries. We apply a global vector autoregres-
sive model (global VAR) to investigate the degree of trade linkages and shock trans-
mission between South Africa and the BRIC countries over the period 1995Q1-
2009Q4. The model contains 32 countries and has two di⁄erent estimations: the
￿rst one consists of 24 countries and one region, with the 8 countries in the euro
area treated as a single economy; and the second estimation contains 20 countries
and two regions, with the BRIC and the euro area countries respectively treated
as a single economy. The results suggest that trade linkages exist between our
focus economies; however the magnitude di⁄ers between countries. Shocks from
each BRIC country are shown to have considerable impact on South African real
imports and output.
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11 Introduction
Increasing globalisation and economic integration raises a number of important issues.
Particularly, it makes countries vulnerable to external shocks. In order to assess these
external shocks there is a growing need to model the sources of foreign in￿ uence on
domestic economies. The global vector autoregressive (global VAR) framework is a
powerful tool that is able to assess these shocks through trade linkages, ￿nancial linkages
and so on. The global VAR model proposed by Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner (2004),
Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran and Smith (2007) and Dees, Holly, Pesaran and Smith (2007)
combines country-speci￿c models into a global framework and allows for the analysis of
interactions between countries/regions in the study, while avoiding any dimensionality
problems. This model yields results that are invariant to country and to the ordering of
the variables.
Our interest in this paper is to model a small open economy, South Africa (SA),
and its trade linkages with the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries. SA￿ s
integration into the global economy is characterized mainly by high exports growth
(Petersson, 2005). A signi￿cant growth in exports has been accompanied by a change in
SA￿ s direction of trade. In particular, there has been a shift in its major markets from
the European Union (EU) and the US towards the southern engines. We therefore apply
a global VAR model to investigate the degree of trade linkages and shock transmission
between SA and the BRIC countries over the period 1995Q1-2009Q4.
The rationale for assessing the impact of trade between SA and the BRIC countries
is based on the perception, as articulated in Goldman Sachs￿report (Wilson and Pu-
rushothaman, 2003), that the BRIC countries are developing fast and by the year 2050
will surpass the level of development in most of the current developed countries. The
BRICs does not originate because of its in￿ uence as a formal trading bloc or a political
alliance. Instead, it is a forum that provides its members with opportunities to network
and to initiate economic arrangements. The BRICs represents a model of economic
development exempli￿ed by strong economic growth and an enormous capacity to com-
pete in a globalised world. In 2011, SA joined the BRIC group, hence the creation of
the BRICS. The BRIC member countries are representatives of their regions, and SA
represents the African continent as it is the largest economy in the continent. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst attempt to investigate the response of SA
trade and output to shocks originating from the BRICs as a bloc and from individual
countries.
2Trade linkage is an important feature of economic integration between countries.
However, there is no common view on whether more intense trade linkages lead to
more or less business cycle synchronisation. Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998) point out
that the countries which have strong trade linkages have somewhat similar business
cycles.1 In addition, Frankel and Rose (1998) demonstrate that trade linkages foster
transmission of aggregate shocks across countries. For example, a positive export shock
in one country may lead to a rise in demand for goods produced in the recipient countries.
The magnitude of such e⁄ects depends on the intensity of trade linkages between the
countries in question. According to Forbes and Chinn (2004), direct trade between
countries seems to be one of the main determinants of cross-country linkages.2 However,
Krugman (1993) indicates that intense trade linkages across countries actually may
have reverse e⁄ect since countries specialise more as they become more integrated. The
current international trade dynamics are leading to important changes in the structure
of global trade. There is a growing argument that some speci￿c emerging economies
are playing important roles and are at the center of the realignment of the world trade
structure (Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006; Evenett, 2007; Akin and Kose, 2008).
The BRICS economies have been integrating with the global economy through trade
and ￿nancial activities. The share of total trade in the world market increased for all
its member countries between 1998 and 2008.3 The world market share of the BRICS￿
total trade increased from 6.7% in 1998 to 14.8% in 2008 (OECD, 2010). Moreover,
these countries are di⁄erent from one another in their culture, background, language,
the structure of their economies and the integration with the world market. On one
hand, China and India have rapidly growing economies and have limited availability of
natural resources. China￿ s economic growth is stimulated mainly by manufacturing and
India￿ s by software services and call centres. They are net importers of commodities and
emerge as dominant global suppliers of manufactured goods and services. Moreover,
these economies have a common economic growth performance.4 On the other hand,
Brazil, Russia and SA have an abundance of natural resources and export mainly raw
materials; they also have lower economic growth than China and India.5 The key driver
1Many other seminal studies have supported this argument, such as Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005)
and Inklaar, Jong-A-Pin and Haan (2007).
2Further evidence on the e⁄ect of international trade linkages on the business cycle can be found
in Yi (2003), Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005), Kose and Yi (2006) and Burstein, Christopher and Tesar
(2008).
3China￿ s share increased from 3.4% to 9%, Brazil￿ s from 0.9% to 1.2%, India￿ s from 0.6% to 1.1%,
Russia￿ s from 1.3% to 2.9% and SA￿ s increased from 0.3% to 0.4%.
4The growth rate of China and India averaged 11.3% and 8.1% per annum between 2005 and 2010.
5Russia, Brazil, and SA experienced signi￿cantly lower economic growth than China and India, with
an average of 4.2%, 4.1%, and 4% per annum, between 2005 and 2010 respectively (WB, 2010).
3of Brazil￿ s economic growth is the exploitation of raw materials. The industrial sector
is also developing strongly, led by machinery and transport equipment. Brazil is the
largest exporter in Latin America. Recently, the exploitation of energy resources has
boosted the economic growth in Russia (GTI, 2007).6 SA￿ s exports consist mainly of
basic commodities and natural resources such as gold, diamond, platinum, iron and
steel products, mineral fuels and motor vehicles. It is the largest economy in the African
continent and occupies a strategic position in the continent. According to Arora and
Vamvakidis (2005) South African economic growth has a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on
growth in the continent.
In addition to the increased trade ￿ ows with the global economy, trade amongst these
countries is also increasing. Within the BRICS countries, Russia was the top Chinese
export destination until 2009, followed by India, Brazil, and SA. In 2009, India became
China￿ s top export partner, followed by Russia.7 China is also an important market for
these countries, being the largest market for Brazil in 2009, the second-largest market
for Russia, third for India and followed by SA.8 Until 2008 Russia was the top Chinese
supplier, followed by Brazil, India, and SA. In 2009, Brazil took over and became China￿ s
top supplier within the BRICS. Hence, as a group, they are China￿ s fourth largest trading
partner9 (IMF, 2010). However, none of these countries is as signi￿cant to China in the
global market as China is to them. All of these statistics imply that there are signi￿cant
interactions within and between these countries and the world.
The recent and current economic performance as well as the forecast for coming
years has increased interest in these countries.10 There is considerable attention paid to
research on, on one hand, the importance of the BRICS countries in the world economy
and, on the other, the pace of development achieved by these countries. The rise of the
BRICS is fast attaining a visible role on the international scene and certainly impacting
on the process and direction of growth of the global economy. Due to their high economic
growth and sheer geographical size, these countries have emerged as important powers
6In 2009 Russia became the biggest oil producer in the world with its share of 12.9% of world oil
production, followed by Saudi Arabia with 12% (BP, 2010).
7China exports valued at 29, 17, 14 and 7 billion US dollar to India, Russia, Brazil and SA, respec-
tively.
8China imports valued at 28, 21, 13, and 8 billion US dollar from Brazil, Russia, India and SA,
respectively.
9Japan is China￿ s largest trading partner, followed by the US and euro area, with trade valued at
around 352, 252, and 176 billion US dollar respectively (IMF, 2010).
10For instance, Jensen and Larsen, 2004; O￿ Neill, Wilson, Purushothaman and Stupnytska, 2005;
Georgieva, 2006; Jenkins and Edwards, 2006; Winters and Yusuf, 2007; Gu, Humphrey and Messner,
2008; McDonald, Robinson and Thierfelder, 2008; Nayyar, 2009; OECD, 2009; and Santos-Paulino and
Wan, 2010.
4at both regional and global levels. Economic performance of these countries in the last
decade was quite impressive.11 In the second quarter of 2010, China surpassed Japan,
becoming the second-largest economy in the world. This contrasts with the situation
only a decade ago when China was the 7th, Brazil the 10th, Russia the 15th and India the
16th largest economies. Over the last decade the Chinese, Indian, Russian and Brazilian
economies grew at average rates of 10%, 7%, 6% and 3% respectively (WB, 2010). Even
with the current economic crisis that started in 2007, these countries￿growth continues
to lead the rest of the world. In 2009, the economic growth rate of developed countries,
such as Japan and Germany, dropped by around 6%, while that of China grew by 9.1%
and India by 7.6%. However, the Brazilian and Russian economies contracted by 0.1%
and 7.9%, respectively (OECD, 2010). SA￿ s economic performance was lower than that
of the BRIC grouping, despite its robust economic growth averaging 4% in the last
decade. In 2009, economic growth of SA dropped to around 1.8% (OECD, 2010). In
2010, SA ranked as the 25th largest economy in the world, according to the IMF￿ s GDP
(PPP).
The BRIC economies altogether could be larger than the G-6￿ s12 in less than 40
years13 and, by 2025, they could account for over half the size of the G-6 (O￿ Neill,
Lawson, Wilson, Purushothamn, Buchanan and Gri¢ ths, 2004). Consequently, among
the G-6 countries, only the US and Japan will remain among the six largest economies in
the world. These predictions re￿ ect the increasingly important role that these economies
are expected to play in the coming years. However, some researchers observe that certain
factors could obscure this optimistic view. For instance, Jensen and Larsen (2004)
and Georgieva (2006) emphasise the speci￿c risks and challenges in each country and
indicate that the sustainability of high economic growth, witnessed so far depends on
several important factors, such as sound and stable macroeconomic and development
policies, development of strong and capable institutions, human development, as well as
an increasing degree of openness. These predictions re￿ ect the increasingly important
role this bloc is expected to play as an economic powerhouse and political leader, and it
is aberrant for any country to ignore this switch in power. This paper bridges the gap in
11According to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), the IMF￿ranked
China, India, Russia, and Brazil, in that order, as the second, fourth, sixth, and seventh world￿ s largest
economies in 2010 (IMF, 2010).
12The G-6 includes France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US.
13China is expected to surpass the US as the world￿ s largest economy by 2041. In 30 years, India￿ s
economy would be larger than all but the US and China and move to the third position by 2050, given
that it is predicted to continue being one of the fastest-growing economies over the next 30 to 50 years.
Brazil will be larger than Germany by 2036 and, hence, it will be the world￿ s ￿fth largest economy by
2050. Russia will overtake Germany, France, Italy and the UK by 2030 and will become the world￿ s
sixth largest economy by 2050 (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003).
5the literature in analysing empirically the response of South African economic variables
to shocks from the BRIC countries.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the current patterns of South
African foreign trade with the BRIC countries. Section 3 explains the model, while
Section 4 describes the data, outlines the speci￿cation and the estimation of the model.
Section 5 reports the empirical results and their interpretation. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 South African foreign trade with the BRIC coun-
tries
SA experienced total export growth of around US$ 24 billion in 1994, US$ 29 billion
in 2000, US$ 50 billion in 2005 and US$ 60 billion in 2009. The signi￿cant growth in
exports has been accompanied by a change in SA￿ s direction of trade, with a shift in its
major markets away from the EU and the US towards the southern engines.
Trade between SA and the BRIC countries jumped from 4.1% in 2000 to 13.8% in
2009, whereas trade between SA and the world grew from 10.1% to 32.4% in the same
period. Today, China, India, Brazil and Russia rank as SA￿ s ￿rst, eighth, 17th, and 40th
largest trade partners, respectively. Table 1 and Table 2 show that China dominates the
BRIC-SA trade ￿ ows, accounting for around two-thirds of the BRIC-SA trade. SA has
also managed to maintain, and accelerate its trade ties with India, Brazil, and Russia
since 2000.
2.1 Foreign trade by country
Table 1 shows the percentage of SA￿ s top export destinations between 2000 and 2009.
It shows that in 2000, SA￿ s top export destinations were the US followed by the UK
and Japan. In 2005, Japan became the top SA￿ s export destination, followed by the
UK, the US and Germany. However, in 2009, China overtook the US, Japan, Germany,
and the UK, and became SA￿ s leading export destination, registering 53.9% annual
growth. China received 9.4% of total South African exports in 2009. According to
the Department of Trade and Industry￿ s (DTI), SA￿ s exports to China experienced
particularly rapid growth from less than US$ 600 million in 2000 to around US$ 6
billion in 2009.
On the import side, Table 2 depicts the percentage of SA￿ s top source of imports over
the period 2000 and 2009. Developed countries such as Germany, the US, Japan, and the
UK have been among SA￿ s top source of imports. Germany was the dominant supplier
6of imports to SA from 2000 to 2009. But in 2009, China became the biggest import
market, overtaking Germany, and supplied 13% of total SA￿ s imports, while imports
from Germany were 11.5%. Imports from India, Brazil and Russia increased from 0.9%,
1%, and 0.3% of total imports in 2000, to 2.9%, 1.9%, and 0.6% in 2009, respectively.
Meanwhile, India currently is the eighth largest import source to SA. It is notable that
some developing countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, occupy the ￿fth and sixth
positions of SA￿ s biggest source of imports.
2.2 Foreign trade by product group
Table 3 lists the top ￿ve most important South African export products to the BRIC
countries. It shows that SA￿ s exports to the BRIC countries generally consist of basic
commodities. In addition, China and India import signi￿cant amounts of precious stones,
for instance platinum, gold, and diamonds. According to Sandrey and Jensen (2007)
around 46% of China￿ s platinum and 26% of its diamonds are supplied by SA.
Looking more deeply, SA￿ s exports to China comprise of natural resources such as
coal, gold and uranium (62.5%), iron and steel (18%), and non-ferrous metals (7.3%). As
is the case with China, SA￿ s exports to India also consist mainly of basic commodities,
coal (57.5%), chemicals (15.9%), iron and steel (8.5%), and non-ferrous metals (4.4%).
SA￿ s main exports to Brazil includes coal accounts (11.6%), chemical products (31.6%),
motor vehicles, parts and accessories (15.8%), non-ferrous metals (4.9%), and iron and
steel (14.6%). Together these products constitute 78.7% of SA￿ s exports to Brazil. SA￿ s
exports to Russia is di⁄erent from the product grouping that it exports to other BRIC
countries and mainly consist of agricultural products, such as forestry, ￿sh, food, and
beverages, which account for 50%, 10% and 3%, respectively. SA also exports machinery
and equipment (10%) and mining products (15%) to Russia.
On the import side, Table 4 illustrates the top ￿ve SA￿ s imports by categories from
the BRICs. It shows that SA￿ s imports from China commonly consist of machinery and
electrical equipment, textiles, clothing, and footwear. Coke and re￿ned petroleum, ￿bres,
electrical equipment, motor vehicles, and chemicals are the main imports from India.
SA￿ s major imports from Brazil are motor vehicles, parts and accessories, machinery and
equipment, and electrical machinery, as well as agricultural goods. SA mainly imports
mining, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, and agricultural goods from Russia.
It is evident that most of SA￿ s export products face little competition from China,
Brazil and India. For instance, Brazil exports mainly vehicles, machinery, iron and
steel, ores as well as agricultural products, while China exports machinery and elec-
trical equipment, clothing, textiles and footwear, and chemicals (Naude, 2009). India
mainly exports precious metals and stones, mineral fuels, clothing and organic chemicals
7(Sandrey and Jensen, 2007).
3 Methodology
Since the seminal work of Sims (1980) there has been an increase in popularity of the
vector autoregressive (VAR) model, especially in empirical macroeconomics. However,
these models can only deal with a relatively small number of variables and are often
estimated using data for a cross-sectional unit, ignoring possible international linkages.
When international linkages are present in a VAR model, then the model would have to
include either higher-order time lags or have to include half a dozen domestic variables so
as to capture the complicated international linkages. Moreover, the coe¢ cient estimates
of the model would not have the same interpretation as in a closed-economy model since
all economies are now open, and therefore the impact of foreign variables should be taken
into account. In a standard VAR model, each variable is allowed to have an independent
e⁄ect on the dependent variables. Panel VAR models have also been applied to construct
multi-country models (Ballabriga, Sebastian, and Valles, 1999).14 Panel VAR models
combine several VAR coe¢ cients and assume that the regressors do not include any
contemporaneous endogenous variables and thus, they su⁄er from the same criticism
(Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach, 2008).
To answer these issues, Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004), Dees, di Mauro,
Pesaran, and Smith (2007) and Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith (2007) develop a global
VAR model to examine the global interactions and to simplify the analysis of country
shocks on the world economy. They combine several VAR models and take a slightly
di⁄erent approach by allowing unrestricted coe¢ cients for the domestic variables and
carefully construct country-speci￿c foreign variables for use in each of the separate
country-speci￿c models. The country-speci￿c foreign variables are treated as weakly
exogenous when estimating the model for each country.15 The country-speci￿c vector
error-correcting models are estimated individually for each country/region, where do-
mestic variables are related to the corresponding foreign variables. The country-speci￿c
models are then combined to simultaneously generate impulse response functions for
all variables in the world economy. The aim of the global VAR model is to provide a
￿ exible structure for use in a variety of applications (Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner,
2004).16
14For more detail on multi-country models see Canova and Cicarelli (2006).
15In a global VAR, each of the country/region-speci￿c models is estimated using a range of country-
speci￿c domestic and foreign variables which are constructed as a weighted average of endogenous
variables in other countries. The weighting matrix is derived from the trade pattern
16For instance, Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran and Smith (2007) use a global VAR model to analyse the
8The global VAR approach also allows for the interdependencies between countries
and/or regions at a variety of levels in a transparent manner that can be evaluated em-
pirically, including long-run relationships consistent with the theory and data. The inter-
dependencies between countries can be summarised in three transparent ways. Firstly,
it combines the individual country VAR models where domestic variables are related
to country-speci￿c foreign variables in a rational way, to match the international trade
pattern of the country under consideration. Secondly, non-zero pair-wise correlations
in residuals between countries and equations are allowed to capture a certain amount
of dependence in idiosyncratic shocks. Lastly, it allows dependence of country-speci￿c
variables on common global shocks that can a⁄ect all countries simultaneously such as
oil prices (Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith , 2007).
3.1 Country speci￿c models
Let us consider the global VAR model as proposed by Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner
(2004) and further developed by Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007). Assume
that there are N + 1 countries in the global economy, indexed by i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N,
where 0 serves a reference country and denoting each country i modelled as a VARX*:




i;t￿1 + ￿i0dt + ￿i1dt￿1 + "it (1)
where t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T, xit indicates a (ki ￿ 1) vector of domestic variables belonging to
country i, at time t, x￿
it is a (k￿
i ￿ 1) vector of foreign variables speci￿c to country i, ci0
is a (ki ￿ 1) vector of ￿xed intercept coe¢ cients, ci1 is a (ki ￿ 1) vector of coe¢ cients of
the deterministic time trend, ￿i is a (ki ￿ ki) matrix of coe¢ cients associated to lagged
domestic variables, while ￿i0 and ￿i1 are (ki ￿ k￿
i) matrices of coe¢ cients related to
contemporaneous and lagged foreign variables respectively, dt is a set of common global
variables assumed to be weakly exogenous to the global economy, such as oil prices and
￿i0 and ￿i1 are the matrices of ￿xed coe¢ cients. The error term "it is a (ki ￿ 1) vector
of idiosyncratic, serially uncorrelated, country-speci￿c shocks, where "it ￿ i:i:d:(0;￿ii)
and is non-singular for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N, and t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T. The global VAR
approach allows for non-zero contemporaneous dependence of shocks across countries
through cross-country covariances:
￿ij = Cov("it;"jt) = E("it"
0
jt0), for i 6= j
international linkages of the euro area, which treats the euro area as a single economy. Pesaran, Smith
and Smith (2007) use it to model the decision of United Kingdom and Sweden not to join the Euro and
Dees, Pesaran, Smith and Smith (2008) construct a theoretically consistent measure of a steady-state
global economy. Finally, Pesaran, Schuermann and Smith (2009) use the global VAR model to forecast
economic and ￿nancial variables across 33 countries.
9A standard component of ￿ij will be indicated by ￿ij;ls = Cov("ilt;"jst), which is
the covariance of the lth variable in country i with the sth variable in country j. The
set of country speci￿c-foreign variables, x￿
it, are built using ￿xed trade weights. The
weights are computed using cross-country trade weighted averages of the corresponding
variables given by trade shares, such that wij is the share of country j in the total trade
(exports plus imports) of country i measure in US dollar. Therefore:
wii = 0, 8 i = 0;1;2;:::;N
and XN
j=0 wij = 1, 8 i;j = 0;1;2;:::;N







where wij ￿ 0 are the weights attached to the foreign variables. The foreign variables, x￿
it,
and global variables (in this study the oil price), poil
it , are treated as weakly exogenous.18
This considers each economy as small when compared to the rest of the world. The
weights, wij, capture the importance of country j for country i. The weights used in
this paper are based on cross-country trade ￿ ows. They are computed using the annual
trade averages over the period 2006-2008. We allow country-speci￿c shocks to be weakly
correlated with shocks in other countries or regions through the link between domestic
and foreign variables. These shocks are serially uncorrelated and cross-sectionally weakly













￿ij for t = t0
0 for t 6= t0
Therefore, the global VAR model allows for interdependence between countries or
regions through three separate but interrelated channels: (1) the direct dependence of
domestic variables, xit, with foreign variables, x￿
it, and with their lagged values; (2) the
dependence of the country-speci￿c domestic variables, xit, on common global exogenous
variables, dt, such as oil prices and their related lagged values; (3) the contemporaneous
17It is not necessary that the number of variables in the di⁄erent country models should be same.
18Pesaran, Schuerrmann, and Weiner (2004) provide theoretical arguments and empirical evidence of
the weak exogeneity assumption that allows country/region-speci￿c models to be estimated consistently.
10dependence of the idiosyncratic shock in country i on the shocks in country j, measured
via the cross-country covariances, as ￿ij indicated above.
Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004) propose that the country-speci￿c models
be estimated separately to accommodate the weak exogeneity assumption of foreign
variables rather than to estimate directly the complete system of N +1 country-speci￿c
models (1) together with the relations linking the foreign variables (2). In practice, this
exogeneity assumption should hold for small open economies where the impact of global
markets and/or regions is generally exogenously given. Therefore, such an assumption
seems reasonable to a small player in the global economy such as SA.
3.2 Building the global VAR
This section illustrates the process of combining the country-speci￿c models into a
global VAR model. The estimated parameters from the country-speci￿c models are
then stacked together to build a global VAR. In the view of the simultaneous depen-
dence of the domestic variables, xit, on the foreign variables, x￿
it, the country-speci￿c
VARX* models (1) are solved simultaneously for all the domestic variables, xit, i = 0,
1, 2, ..., N. Let us consider the general country-speci￿c model (1) without the set of
global variables, because these variables are considered endogenous for the US model,
as it is the dominant economy in the model, while weakly exogenous for the remaining
country-speci￿c models. Thus, equation (1) becomes:




i;t￿1 + "it (3)
The global variables are included as foreign variables for all countries except the US
model. To construct the global VAR model from the individual country-speci￿c models,








Aizit = ci0 + ci1t + Bizi;t￿1 + "it (4)
where Ai = (Iki ￿ ￿i0), Bi = (￿i ￿ ￿i1). The dimensions of Ai and Bi are ki ￿(ki + k￿
i)
and Ai has a full row rank, that is rank(Ai) = ki.
Secondly, we collect all country/region-speci￿c domestic variables together to create
a global vector, gt, with dimension k ￿ 1, where k =
PN
i=0 ki, denote the total number




0. We start by assuming
that all country-speci￿c variables in the global economy are endogenously determined.
11However, there are complex trade linkages between countries, for instance in the case
of trade ￿ ow variables. Endogeneity is implicit in the construction of aggregate exports
and imports as the exports from country i1 to country i2 are the imports from country
i2 to country i1 and vice-versa. We can now write country-speci￿c variables in terms of
the global variable vector, gt, to obtain the following identity:
zit = Ligt for 8 i = 0;1;2;:::;N (5)
where Li is the (ki + k￿
i)￿k matrix collecting the trade weights wij, 8 i;j = 0;1;2;:::;N.
Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004) de￿nes Li as the link matrices which allows
the country-speci￿c models to be written in terms of the global variable vector, gt.
Furthermore, using the identity in equation (5) in each country-speci￿c model (4), it
follows that:
AiLigt = ci0 + ci1t + BiLigt￿1 + "it (6)
where AiLi and BiLi are both ki ￿ k dimensional matrices.
Finally, by stacking each country-speci￿c model in equation (6), we obtain the global
VAR for all the endogenous variables in the system, gt,
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The K matrix has dimensions k ￿ k and if it is non-singular, such as of full rank,
then we can invert it. By inverting the K matrix we get the global VAR model in its
reduced form:
gt = b0 + b1t + Hgt￿1 + ￿t (8)
where gt is the global k ￿ 1 vector, where k =
PN
i=0 ki is the total number of the
endogenous variables in the global model, containing the macroeconomic variables for
all the countries, gt is a function of time, the lagged values of all macroeconomic variables
gt￿1, and the exogenous variables common to all countries and their lags. b0 and b1 are
vectors k ￿ 1 of coe¢ cients, H is a k ￿ k matrix of coe¢ cients, and ￿t is a k ￿ 1
vector of reduced-form shocks that are linear functions of the country-speci￿c shocks,




0, var(￿t) = K￿1￿"K0￿1, and
￿" = var("t).
Since the country-speci￿c weights convince the adding-up restrictions, k =
PN
i=0 ki =
1, the link matrices must be of full rank and allow the link matrix to be non-singular as
12well. The model in (8) is solved recursively and used to construct generalised impulse
response analysis in the usual manner. There are no restrictions placed on the covariance
matrix, ￿" = E("t"0
t)
Brie￿ y, the global VAR model can be described in two stages. In the ￿rst stage,
country-speci￿c VARX* models, namely VAR models augmented by weakly I(1) vari-
ables (such as domestic variables and cross-section averages of foreign variables) are
estimated for each country/region individually. In the second stage, the estimated coef-
￿cients from the country/region-speci￿c models are stacked and solved in one big system
such as global VAR. This model is a useful framework in this instance, given its abil-
ity to model the international transmission of shocks. In this paper, we build a global
VAR model, following Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004) and Dees, di Mauro,
Pesaran, and Smith (2007), to assess the importance of trade linkages between SA and
the BRICs.
4 Data and estimation of the model
In this paper, the global VAR model19 contains 32 countries from di⁄erent regions of
the world. Table 5 presents countries and regions included in the model. We have two
di⁄erent estimations in our model. Firstly, the 8 countries in the euro area are grouped
together and treated as a single economy, while the remaining 24 countries are modelled
individually. Secondly, the BRIC countries and the euro area are modelled separately as
a single economy, while the remaining 20 countries are estimated individually. Therefore,
the global VAR model contains 24 countries and one region in the ￿rst and 20 countries
and two regions in the second estimation. The models are estimated for the period
1995Q1-2009Q4.20
The ￿rst step in the construction of the model is the selection of variables to include
in the analysis. Given the objective of this paper the real output, real exports and real
imports are the main variables of interest. In addition, we include the real e⁄ective
exchange rates and in￿ ation, given their typical e⁄ect on trade. Finally, to account for
possible common factors we also include the price of oil.
We select the following country-speci￿c domestic, xit, and foreign variables, x￿
it, for
19We would like to thank Vanessa Smith and Alessandro Galesi for making their
Matlab codes available to us. These codes can be downloaded from: http://www-
cfap.jbs.cam.ac.uk/research/gvartoolbox/index.html
20Details about the data sources are reported in Appendix
13country i = 1, 2, ..., N:









where yit is the log real output, exit is the log real exports, imit is the log real imports,
rerit is the log real e⁄ective exchange rates, dpit is the log of the rate of in￿ ation and
poil
t is the log of the nominal spot price of oil.
The country-speci￿c foreign variables are built using ￿xed trade weights based on












where wij, the weights, are the share of country j in the trade of country i such that
wij = 0 and
PN
j=0 wij = 1. The motivation behind choosing the trade weights is to ac-
commodate the e⁄ects of external shocks that could pass through output in all countries
via trade channels. The set of country-speci￿c foreign variables represents the dynamics
of the global economic variables, which are assumed to impact and shape SA￿ s macro-
economic variables. The trade shares for the BRICS economies, with a Rest category
showing the trade shares with the remaining 19 countries in the model, are presented in
Table 6.22
In case of the US economy, domestic and foreign variables are treated di⁄erently
because the US is treated as a reference country. The US model is linked to the world
through the assumption that exchange rates are determined in the remaining country-
speci￿c models. Therefore, we have the following domestic and foreign variables for the
US model:







Given the importance of the US economy for the global economy we include the price
of oil as an endogenous variable for the US model and treat the set of real exchange rates
as weakly exogenous for the US model, while the real exchange rates are treated as an
endogenous variable and the price of oil is treated as exogenous variable in the models
for all other countries. We then aggregate as follows: Firstly, the economies in the euro
area are modelled in a single regional model and secondly, the BRIC countries in a
single regional VARX* model. The regional variables, such as yit, exit, imit, rerit, dpit
21In our model we did not include the foreign exports and imports from the country/region-speci￿c
models, because theoretically whatever is imported by one country must be exported by another.
22The complete trade share matrix used to build country/region-speci￿c foreign variables in the global
VAR model can be obtained from the authors on request.
14and poil







where yilt indicates output of country l in region i and w0
il are the PPP-GDP weights
(Purchasing Power Parity￿ s adjusted GDP series). Speci￿cally, the weights are based on
the GDP shares of each country in the euro area and the BRIC region. The weights
are constructed by averaging the PPP-GDP for each given country over the period
2006-2008. These weights, which should add up to 1, are then divided by the total PPP-
GDP of the euro area and the BRIC region. They are then used to compute regional
variables, region-speci￿c shocks, such as shocks to a variable across all countries within
a particular region, regional aggregation of impulse responses as well as forecast error-
variance decompositions. It is important to note that these weights (PPP-GDP), used
to aggregate countries into a region, are not the same as the weights (trade weights)
used to build the foreign variables.
The next step is to determine the degree of integration of all the series. We ￿rst
use the traditional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests on levels, ￿rst and second
di⁄erences for all country-speci￿c domestic and foreign variables in the global VAR
model. The lag order of the ADF test statistics is determined by the minimisation of
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), for which the maximum lag allowed is set to 6.
Since the traditional ADF test for unit roots may su⁄er power problems in small samples,
we use the Weighted Symmetric Augmented Dickey-Fuller (WS-ADF) test, which uses
the time reversibility of stationary autoregressiveness. The WS-ADF test statistics are
also based on the related regressions with the same lag order, in accordance with the
AIC. The WS-ADF test results on level and ￿rst di⁄erences, without trend, for our focus
economies are reported in Table 7. The results from the test show that in most countries
the hypothesis of the unit roots cannot be rejected for most of the variables and that
most of variables are integrated of order 1 or I(1).
After ￿nding that most of the variables in most of the countries have a unit root, the
next step is to identify the rank of the cointegration space. We perform a cointegration
analysis, in cases where cointegration is found, and individually estimate each country
VARX* model in its vector error-correcting VECMX* form. Speci￿cally, we carry out
the Johansen￿ s (1992, 1995) reduced-rank procedure. Then, the cointegration rank is
derived by employing the trace test statistic at the 95% critical values and the maximum
eigenvalue statistics. Table 8 presents the number of cointegrating ranks obtained for
each of our focus economy VARX* model and lag orders for each domestic and foreign
variables for each of the BRICS country model. We use White￿ s heteroskedasticity-
corrected standard errors for testing all hypotheses.
15Testing weak exogeneity of foreign and global variables is the key assumption of
the global VAR approach. We estimate the parameters of the country-speci￿c models
using the reduced-rank approach under a weak exogeneity condition. The reduced-rank
approach developed by Johansen (1995) assumes that all variables are endogenously
determined and are of the order I(1). Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2000) propose the
method which allows the inclusion for weakly exogenous variables in a reduced-rank
estimation procedure. Following Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007), we employ
weak exogeneity tests proposed by Johansen (1992) and Harbo, Johansen, Nielsen and
Rahbek (1998). This test assesses the joint signi￿cance of the estimated error-correcting
terms in the marginal models for the foreign variables. This amounts to conducting the
following regression for each lth element of x￿
it in each country i model:
￿x
￿













i;t￿m + "it;l (9)
where ECM
j
i;t￿1, j = 1, 2, ..., ri, is the estimated error-correcting terms associated with
the ri cointegrating relations, the rank, for the country i model with j = 1, 2, ..., ri.
￿xi;t￿k is the set of domestic variables in di⁄erences, with k = 1, 2, ..., pi, where pi is
the lag order of the domestic component of each country i model, ￿x￿
i;t￿m is the set of
foreign and global variables in di⁄erences with m = 1, 2, ..., qi, where qi is the lag order
of the foreign, weakly exogenous, component of each i country model. The test for weak
exogeneity consists of verifying, by means of F-test, the joint hypothesis that ￿ij;l = 0
for each j = 1, 2, ..., ri, in the above regression. The results of F-statistics for testing
the weak exogeneity of each of BRICS country-speci￿c foreign variables and the oil price
are reported in Table 9. It shows that most of the weak exogeneity assumptions cannot
be rejected.
5 Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical ￿ndings based on the dynamic analysis of the global
VAR model. We begin by considering the generalised impulse response functions (GIRFs)
to assess the time pro￿le of the e⁄ects of shocks that we considered. The GIRFs consider
the historical correlations between variables, which are summarised by the estimated
variance-covariance matrix. Therefore, unlike the traditional IRFs, the result of the
GIRFs is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the model, which is important
especially in large macroeconomic system. Secondly, GIRFs can provide insights on how
shocks spread internationally by revealing linkages between countries (Pesaran, Schuer-
mann, and Weiner, 2004). This is followed by the generalised forecast error-variance
16decomposition (GFEVD) for selected variables of interest, given their importance in the
BRICS trade ￿ ows. Similarly, the GFEVD has an advantage of being invariant to the
ordering of variables in the system. It computes the proportion of the variance of the
h-step ahead forecast errors of each variable that is explained by conditioning on con-
temporaneous and future values of the generalised shocks of the system. It is important
to notice that, given the general non-zero correlation between such errors, the individual
shock contributions to the GFEVD need not sum to unity (Dees, Holly, Pesaran and
Smith, 2007).
5.1 Generalised impulse response functions
In this section we consider two di⁄erent types of shocks, namely positive real export
and import shocks for 24 periods. The rationale being that, given two countries that
are linked through trade, an increase in exports in one country translates to a rise in
imports of the other country, and vice-versa. We assess the time pro￿le of the e⁄ects
of these shocks from Brazil, Russia, India, China and the BRIC as a bloc on the South
African economy. Bootstrapped con￿dence intervals are at the 90% signi￿cance level
and are calculated using the sieve bootstrap method with 100 replications.
The empirical results are presented in Figures 1-5. Figure 1 displays positive real
export and import shocks from Brazil. It shows that the export shock from Brazil has a
positive impact on South African imports, which means Brazilian exports trigger imports
in SA. The e⁄ect is signi￿cant and long lasting. However, the e⁄ects seem small. South
African real imports increase by 1% at the impact, and after one year, it reaches 2% and
stays signi￿cant for 24 consecutive quarters. The response of South African output to a
real export shock is zero at the impact, and gradually becomes positive and signi￿cant
from the second to 13th quarters, and insigni￿cant thereafter. The results suggest that
an export shock not only enhances trade linkages between SA and Brazil, but is also
bene￿cial to the South African economy in that it a⁄ects the overall economy, even
though the positive e⁄ect on output is short lived. In contrast, South African exports
and output seem immune to an import shock from Brazil. The impact of this shock
seems signi￿cant between the second and the sixth quarters for South African exports,
and between the second to ninth quarters for South African output. Hence, the results
point somewhat to an importance of an export shock relative to an import shock for the
South African economy. As shown in Table 1, Brazil is the 24th and 21st largest export
destination and import source, respectively, for SA. From Brazil￿ s side, SA is the 26th
and 41st most important export destination and import source, respectively (WB, 2009
and UN, 2009).
Figure 2 presents the GIRFs of positive real export and import shocks from Russia.
17South African real import and output react positively to a real export shock from Russia.
This shock has small impact on both South African real imports and output. The
e⁄ect on real imports is at around 0.01% at impact and reaches to 0.05% after 24
consecutive quarters. In the case of South African output, this is zero at impact, but
becomes signi￿cant at the 12th quarters when the e⁄ect increases to 0.05% and at the
24th quarters when it reaches 0.08%. A positive real import shock has a positive but
insigni￿cant impact on both South African real exports and output. The response of
South African real exports to this shock becomes signi￿cant at the ￿fth quarter when
the impact is around 0.01%, but this impact ￿zzles out at the 11th quarter. These
results con￿rm the observation in Table 1, which ranks Russia at 40th and 53rd position
as export destination and source of import respectively. From the Russian side, SA is
the 104th export destination and the 51st import partner (WB, 2009 and UN, 2009). It
implies that trade linkages with SA appears relatively weak, in that an export shock has
an impact on the South African economy, but the impact is small, while SA does not
react to an import shock.
In Figure 3, the real export shock from India has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on
South African real imports. At impact, South African real imports increase by 1% and
remain high. However, the e⁄ect is short-lived in that the shock becomes insigni￿cant
after the seventh quarter. Similarly, South African output reacts positively. The e⁄ect is
zero at the impact and increases gradually and becomes signi￿cant after the ￿rst quarter
and ￿zzles out after the third quarter. The second shock is the real-imports shock from
India. The e⁄ect on South African real export increases slowly and becomes signi￿cant
in the second period following the shock and stays high. Unlike the export shock, the
import shock has a long-lasting e⁄ect. Similarly, output reacts positively and the e⁄ect
is signi￿cant and permanent. Hence, an import shock from India behaves like a supply
shock in SA, while the export shock displays characteristics of a demand shock. Notice
that India is ranked, in order of importance, in the eighth position in 2009 for both
export destination and import resources for SA respectively (see Table 1 and Table 2).
This makes India one of the major trading partners of SA. SA is also ranked the 21st
export destination and the 24th import trading partner of India (WB, 2009 and UN,
2009). These results point to an increasing trade tie between the two countries.
From Figure 4 we ￿nd that a positive real export shock from China increases South
African real imports immediately, reaching 1%, and gradually rises and attains a maxi-
mum of 2% after the ninth quarter and becomes insigni￿cant thereafter. The response
of South African real output to this shock is positive, but becomes signi￿cant after the
third period following the shock and remains signi￿cant for approximately three periods.
The second shock, the real import shock from China, does not really have an impact
18on South African real exports and output. Both South African real export and output
reacts to this shock positively, but their e⁄ects are insigni￿cant. One would expect a
positive response of South African exports and output following a Chinese import shock,
but the empirical results do not support such an expectation. The results suggest South
African companies are less aggressive in penetrating the Chinese markets, while they
have managed to do so in India. China has become SA￿ s number one trading partner in
2009, as shown in Table 1 and Table 2, and it is surprising that its overall performance
does not translate into tangible performance in SA. Nevertheless, its exports do trigger
South African output and import, an indication of the e⁄ects of trade links between the
two countries.
Lastly, Figure 5 presents real export and import shocks from the BRIC, as a bloc.
A positive export shock from the BRIC has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on South
African imports. The impact is 1% at the impact and reaches 2.4% after the 24th
quarters. This shock a⁄ects South African output only in the short term. Output does
not react at impact, but becomes signi￿cant after the third quarter following the shock
and the e⁄ect dies out after the seventh quarter. A real import shock from the BRIC
region has a positive but insigni￿cant e⁄ect on South African export at impact, but
becomes signi￿cant after the ￿rst quarter and ￿zzles out after the seventh quarters. The
response of South African real output to this shock is positive and signi￿cant over the
20th quarters. It corresponds to an increase of 0.1% at impact, reaches 0.3% at the 20th
quarters and then becomes insigni￿cant the 21st quarters after the impact.
5.2 Generalised forecast error variance decompositions
This section examines the relative contribution of shocks from individual BRIC countries
and the BRIC as a region to South African variables. Table 10 presents the generalised
forecast error variance decompositions for each of the South African variables explained
by the real output, import and export shocks from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and the
BRIC. The results are on average over a 24-quarter.
From the estimated fraction of the variance decomposition explained by the real ex-
port shocks from Brazil, Russia, India, China and the BRIC region, it generally appears
to have small e⁄ects on South African real output and exports. For example the export
shock from Brazil, Russia, India, China and the BRIC region only explains 1.2%, 0.6%,
0.8%, 0.7%, and 0.8% of the variation in real output and 0.1%, 0.8%, 0.9%, 1.3%, and
1.3% in real exports respectively. However, the fraction of the variance explained by the
real-exports shocks from these countries and the BRIC bloc is estimated to be large for
the South African real import and real exchange rates. For instance, the export shock
from Brazil, Russia, India, China and the BRIC region only explains 2.1%, 1.1%, 4.1%,
191.7%, and 1.6% of the variation in real import and 1.5%, 3.7%, 0.1%, 4.5%, and 3.7% in
real exchange rates respectively. All of these con￿rm the results shown through Figure
1-5. Real export shocks from the individual BRIC countries and the BRIC region have
a positive and signi￿cant impact on South African real imports.
Looking at the relative contribution of the real import shocks from Brazil, Russia,
India, China and the BRIC region, it can be noted that the fraction of the forecast error
variances mainly appears to be large for South African real exports and real exchange
rates, whereas it appears to be small for real output and real imports, except for the
shocks from Brazil and the BRIC region. The import shock from Russia, India, and
China explains 1.8%, 1.2%, and 1.3% of the variation in real exports. It is evident
that that the exchange rate is the main channel of transmission of trade shocks, scoring
high values of forecast error variance. This ￿nding is also consistent with the previous
literature as stated by Friedman (1953) and Mundell (1961), in that the exchange rate
acts as a shock absorber, mitigating the e⁄ects on the economy of external shocks.
However, the real import shock from Brazil mainly explains 2.7% of variation in South
African real exports and 2.4% in output, while a real import shock from the BRIC region
explains 2.8% of the forecast error variance of South African real imports and 4.5% of
the forecast error variance for real exchange rates.
In general, we observe that an Indian real export shock is transmitted more powerfully
to South African real imports than the other shocks. Secondly, the real import shock
from Brazil plays the biggest role of explaining changes in South African real exports.
These results con￿rm trade linkages between these countries and SA, as China is now
SA￿ s number one trading partner, India the 8th, Brazil the 17th and Russia the 40th
largest trade partners.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates trade linkages among South Africa and the BRIC countries as
well as the BRIC region, using quarterly data for the 1995Q1-2009Q4 period, in a global
VAR framework. The results based on generalised impulse response functions show that
export shocks from the BRIC countries, in general, have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on South
African imports and output. Export shocks from China and India have positive, but
short-term e⁄ects on South African imports and output, whereas Brazil and Russia have
a positive and long-term impact on South African imports. Also, real import shocks from
the BRIC countries do not have impact on South African real exports and output, except
for Brazil and India. These results point to important trade linkages these countries have
with SA, especially the importance of export shocks from these countries for SA, but
20less so for imports. This means that good performance of these economies translate to
SA via exports. Similarly, the BRIC as a bloc is closely linked to South African trade
variables. Real export and import shocks from the BRIC region have a positive and
signi￿cant e⁄ect on both South African real imports and exports, but not on output. In
general, real imports and output react forcefully to shocks from the BRIC region and
the exchange rate is the main channel through which these shocks are transmitted in
SA.
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25Table 1: SA￿ s top export destinations, 2000-2009 (percentage)
Rank Exports to 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1 China 1.96 1.74 1.70 2.57 2.21 2.64 3.52 5.71 5.48 9.47
2 US 11.98 8.96 9.00 9.22 10.03 9.52 10.54 10.96 10.33 8.15
3 Japan 8.04 5.02 5.59 7.81 9.08 10.24 10.70 10.55 10.24 6.70
4 Germany 7.77 7.29 6.69 6.30 6.88 6.48 6.87 7.17 7.24 6.46
5 UK 8.86 9.74 9.18 8.81 9.46 10.00 8.18 7.21 6.25 4.94
6 Switzerland 1.78 0.80 0.87 1.54 2.42 2.04 2.64 1.86 1.93 4.19
7 Netherlands 3.32 4.37 4.45 4.41 4.12 4.45 4.54 4.13 4.21 3.59
8 India 1.42 1.43 1.35 1.15 1.25 1.82 1.35 1.95 2.80 3.48
24 Brazil 0.65 0.83 0.64 0.52 0.53 0.62 0.71 0.72 0.83 0.59
40 Russia 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.23 0.22 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.31
Source: SA International Trade Indicators, 2010
Note: Ranked based on Department of Trade and Industry￿ s Trade Statistics, 2010
Table 2: SA￿ s top source of imports, 2000-2009 (percentage)
Rank Exports to 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1 China 3.68 4.19 5.21 6.46 7.53 8.95 9.99 10.73 11.17 13.09
2 Germany 13.27 14.95 15.58 14.79 14.18 14.03 12.48 11.64 11.36 11.58
3 US 11.76 11.92 11.62 9.70 8.45 7.79 7.55 7.66 7.84 7.50
4 Japan 7.94 6.86 6.90 7.03 6.83 6.77 6.55 6.58 5.62 4.89
5 Saudi Arabia 7.41 7.03 4.59 5.83 5.65 5.53 5.28 4.53 6.39 4.99
6 Iran 4.28 4.10 3.61 3.63 5.01 4.10 3.97 3.70 3.81 4.15
7 UK 8.60 8.47 9.07 8.70 6.85 5.55 4.98 4.84 4.10 4.01
8 India 0.94 0.97 1.07 1.22 1.49 2.00 2.33 2.22 2.61 2.92
17 Brazil 1.09 1.53 1.78 2.07 2.10 2.37 2.02 2.08 1.89 1.95
53 Russia 0.30 0.16 0.35 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.39 0.70 0.36 0.66
Source: SA International Trade Indicators, 2010
Note: Ranked based on Department of Trade and Industry￿ s Trade Statistics, 2010
26Table 3: SA￿ s exports by product group, 2003-2009, (US$ in millions)
Country Products 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Chemicals 44.1 53.9 62.4 79.6 96.1 135.6 113.0
Motor vehicles & parts 16.3 15.1 19.9 27.4 45.0 77.8 56.5
Brazil Iron & steel 29.8 57.8 81.2 99.2 136.4 194.6 52.2
Coal mining 22.4 26.9 29.1 51.8 43.5 66.9 41.7
Non-ferrous metals 16.8 19.2 28.7 48.3 47.6 23.2 17.8
Mining 221.9 311.9 505.4 1,028.0 1,904.6 2,568.1 3,610.1
Iron & steel 279.2 262.6 272.3 336.1 880.3 654.6 1,041.7
China Non-ferrous metals 100.0 109.4 173.7 180.4 121.4 373.4 420.8
Chemicals 64.2 114.6 124.9 114.9 159.0 199.3 205.9
Agriculture, forestry & ￿shing 12.6 12.7 22.8 39.9 69.5 77.0 128.5
Coal Mining 32.7 18.8 154.6 94.9 426.3 608.1 1,217.1
Chemicals 127.4 202.6 212.9 227.8 253.3 778.8 336.6
India Iron & steel 41.7 73.1 171.3 113.2 137.1 256.7 181.2
Mining 6.2 14.3 13.0 16.2 57.0 177.0 96.7
Non-ferrous metals 29.6 51.0 170.9 67.1 183.8 129.3 93.9
Agriculture, forestry & ￿shing 37.7 45.9 33.5 52.8 72.5 100.1 94.5
Machinery & equipment 3.0 13.9 7.8 5.8 14.0 17.3 28.3
Russia Food 14.9 4.9 4.0 11.4 8.2 8.9 19.7
Mining 0.2 1.3 0.1 2.7 8.7 13.2 18.9
Beverages 0.9 1.9 2.6 4.5 6.3 14.0 6.8
Source: SAn International Trade Indicators, 2010
27Table 4: SA￿ s imports by product group, 2003-2009, (US$ in millions)
Country Products 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Motor vehicles & parts 255.3 324.8 468.9 513.2 550.4 510.3 368.2
Food 109.5 206.7 288.5 224.5 342.4 389.7 290.5
Brazil Machinery & equipment 80.3 144.5 156.2 149.0 199.6 227.7 117.8
Agriculture, forestry & ￿shing 22.4 46.6 25.3 38.5 35.9 29.5 104.0
Electrical machinery 19.3 27.1 38.1 51.7 99.7 118.6 71.0
Machinery & equipment 509.6 845.1 1,237.7 1,770.6 2,183.2 2,402.4 2,030.7
TV & communication equipment 234.1 385.0 560.9 762.2 1,090.0 1,246.5 1,135.8
China Wearing apparel 227.8 452.6 606.1 859.9 623.9 623.4 744.8
Electrical machinery 96.4 146.6 215.9 349.9 454.5 806.5 458.8
Other industries 126.8 194.7 265.2 334.5 390.0 425.7 425.1
Coke & re￿ned petroleum products 0.3 77.3 140.6 259.4 451.4 762.2 519.0
Chemicals & man-made ￿bres 44.1 60.4 81.0 104.8 121.7 212.9 225.1
India Motor vehicles & parts 21.1 49.3 212.8 318.8 235.1 196.5 178.3
TV & communication equipment 1.3 3.1 4.3 6.5 26.3 120.1 119.7
Chemicals 31.4 54.5 79.4 99.2 93.7 116.5 115.7
Mining 0.0 0.0 57.4 115.3 468.2 157.6 342.5
Agriculture, forestry & ￿shing 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.9
Russia Other industries 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 32.3 20.3
Non-ferrous metals 19.5 11.4 0.9 101.0 39.2 17.8 10.3
Iron & steel 0.9 1.9 8.3 20.1 28.0 21.7 8.9
Source: SA International Trade Indicators, 2010
28Table 5: Countries and regions in the global VAR model
Region Countries Region Countries Countries Countries
Austria Brazil Chile Peru
Belgium Russia Indonesia Singapore
Finland BRICS India Japan Turkey
Euro Area France China Korea UK
Germany SA Malaysia US
Italy Argentina Mexico Sweden
Netherlands Australia Norway Switzerland
Spain Canada New Zealand Thailand
Table 6: Trade weights
Country Brazil China India Russia SA
Brazil 0.0000 0.0222 0.0147 0.0137 0.0204
China 0.1213 0.0000 0.1615 0.1095 0.1158
India 0.0154 0.0266 0.0000 0.0142 0.0278
Russia 0.0483 0.0617 0.0303 0.0000 0.0099
SA 0.0097 0.0092 0.0129 0.0008 0.0000
Rest 0.8053 0.8802 0.7806 0.8618 0.8260
Note: Trade weights are displayed in column by country
Rest :accumulates the remaining countries.
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, 2006-2008, IMF
29Table 7: WS-ADF unit root test statistics for domestic, foreign and global variables
Variables Brazil China India Russia SA
Real GDP y 0.87 1.81 1.13 -0.56 0.21
￿y -6.11 -3.71 -6.77 -3.94 -3.57
In￿ ation dp -1.62 -1.41 -4.28 -1.41 -4.13
￿dp -8.12 -5.32 -6.63 -4.78 -6.44
Domestic variables Exchange rates ep -1.24 0.40 0.76 -0.68 -1.67
￿ep -5.23 -2.44 -4.81 -4.22 -5.1
Real exports ex -0.15 0.25 0.54 -0.45 -0.61
￿ex -5.06 -3.68 0.69 -0.83 -0.63
Real imports im 0.10 0.80 0.69 -0.83 -0.63
￿im -3.08 -5.56 -4.89 -4.54 -4.53
Real GDP ys 0.93 0.44 1.16 0.77 1.24
Foreign variables ￿ys -4.58 -4.18 -4.84 -4.71 -4.61
In￿ ation dps -2.6 -1.54 -2.12 -2.04 -0.94
￿dps -5.19 -4.43 -5.04 -6.22 -6.21
Global variables Oil price poil -0.76 -0.76 -0.76 -0.76 -0.76
￿poil -6.29 -6.29 -6.29 -6.29 -6.29
Note: WS-ADF test statistics are chosen by the modi￿ed AIC with 5% signi￿cant level.
The 95% critical value of the WS-ADF statistics for regressions
with trend is -3.24 and without trend is - 2.55.
30Table 8: VARX* order and cointegrating relationship in the country speci￿c models
Country Lag order of domestic Lag order of foreign Cointegrating relations
Brazil 2 1 2
China 1 1 3
India 2 1 2
Russia 2 2 3
SA 1 1 1
Note: The rank of the cointegrating orders for each country/region is computed
using Johansen￿ s trace statistics at the 95% critical value level.
Table 9: Weak exogeneity tests of country speci￿c foreign and global variables
Country F test Critical values Country speci￿c foreign and global variables
Real GDP In￿ ation Oil prices
Brazil F(3,38) 2.85 2.95 0.14 0.72
China F(2,39) 3.24 1.51 1.12 0.15
India F(2,39) 3.24 1.66 0.15 1.99
Russia F(4,37) 2.63 0.81 0.77 1.24
SA F(1,45) 4.05 0.76 1.22 2.04
Note: Critical values are at the 5% level of signi￿cance
31Table 10: GFEVDs of SA variables explained by the shocks from the BRICs
Shocks from country SAn variables
and variables Real GDP Real imports Real exports REER
Brazil Real export 0.012 0.021 0.010 0.015
Real import 0.024 0.022 0.027 0.007
Russia Real export 0.006 0.011 0.008 0.037
Real import 0.008 0.009 0.018 0.037
India Real export 0.008 0.041 0.009 0.010
Real import 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.048
China Real export 0,007 0.17 0.013 0.045
Real import 0.010 0.016 0.013 0.046
BRIC Real export 0.008 0.016 0.013 0.037
Real import 0.007 0.028 0.012 0.045
Note: Forecast horizon is 24 quarters and forecast error variance of the shock to the real output,
export and import of the BRIC countries and the BRIC, as a region, averaged over 24 quarters.
32Appendix : Data sources
Country GDP CPI Exchange rates Exports Imports Oil price
Argentina IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Australia IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Brazil IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Canada IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
China GVAR IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Chile IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Euro Area IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
India GVAR IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Indonesia IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Japan IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Korea IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Malaysia IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Mexico IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Norway IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
New Zealand IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Peru IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Russia OECD IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
SA IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Singapore GVAR IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Sweden IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Switzerland IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Thailand IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Turkey IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
UK IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
US IFS IFS IFS DOT DOT OECD
Note: Some of the variables compiled from the GVAR Toolbox 1.0,
where quarterly data are not available. These variables can be downloaded from:
http://www-cfap.jbs.cam.ac.uk/research/gvartoolbox/index.html
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